Federal Monitor Files 14th Report; Medina: “It’s a matter that APD don’t know how to do stuff to their liking”; Keller’s Failure “To Own” Reforms As Promised; Appoint Receiver Or Expect 4 More Years Of None Compliance

On March 15, 2018 a hearing was held on the Federal Monitor’s 6th Compliance Report on APD’s Compliance levels with the Court Approved Settlement Agreement. The hearing was the first ever attended by any Mayor with newly elected Mayor Tim Keller appearing along with newly appointed CAO Sarita Nair, Senior Public Safety Officer James B. Lewis, new interim APD Chief Michael Geier and Deputy Chief Harold Medina and new City Attorney Esteban Aguilar, Jr. Also attending was Police Union President Shaun Willoughby.

It was revealed that newly elected Mayor Tim Keller reached out in December, 2017 after being sworn in and had a confidential meeting with the parties and the federal judge. What Keller told the presiding Judge during the March 15, 2018 hearing was simple enough to understand. Kellersaid that he campaigned on the DOJ police reforms, he was committed to fully implement all the police reforms, that his appointed APD management was also fully committed to implementation of constitutional policing practices and that he was confident in the management team he appointed to get the job done. Mayor Keller also said “he owned it” when it came to the reforms and that he would be judged by the progress APD makes or doesn’t make during his term in office.


Fast forward to November 12, 2021. APD is no better off now under Keller than it was on March 15, 2018. APD is still struggling to implement the reforms after 4 full years of the Keller Administration. On November 12, 2021 the Federal Court Appointed Monitor James Ginger filed with the Federal Court his 14th “Compliance Levels of the Albuquerque Police Department and the City of Albuquerque with Requirements of the Court-Approved Settlement Agreement”. The report covers the time frame of February 1, 2021 to July 31, 2021. The link to review the entire 331 page report is here:


This blog article is an in-depth analysis of the 14th Federal Monitor’s report and highlighting the reports major findings. It also provides a reaction to the report by the Keller Administration, APD and the Police union.


On November 14, 2014, and after 6 months of negotiations, the City of Albuquerque, the Albuquerque Police Department and the United State Department of Justice (DOJ) entered into a stipulated Court Approved Settlement Agreement (CASA). The Court Approved Settlement Agreement mandates 271 police reforms, the appointment of a Federal Monitor and the filing of Independent Monitor’s reports (IMRs). There are 276 paragraphs in 10 sections within the CASA with measurable requirements that the monitor reports on.

The link to the 118-page CASA is here:


Under the terms and conditions of the Court Approved Settlement Agreement (CASA), once APD achieves a 95% compliance rate in the 3 identified compliance levels and maintains it for 2 consecutive years, the case can be dismissed. Originally, APD was to have come into compliance within 4 years and the case was to be dismissed in 2020.

The 3 compliance levels can be explained as follows:

1. PRIMARY COMPLIANCE: Primary compliance is the “policy” part of compliance. To attain primary compliance, APD must have in place operational policies and procedures designed to guide officers, supervisors and managers in the performance of the tasks outlined in the CASA. As a matter of course, the policies must be reflective of the requirements of the CASA; must comply with national standards for effective policing policy; and must demonstrate trainable and evaluable policy components.

2. SECONDARY COMPLIANCE: Secondary compliance is attained by implementing supervisory, managerial and executive practices designed to and be effective in implementing the policy as written, e.g., sergeants routinely enforce the policies among field personnel and are held accountable by managerial and executive levels of the department for doing so. By definition, there should be operational artifacts such as reports, disciplinary records, remands to retraining, follow-up, and even revisions to policies if necessary, indicating that the policies developed in the first stage of compliance are known to, followed by, and important to supervisory and managerial levels of the department.

3. OPERATIONAL COMPLIANCE: Operational compliance is attained at the point that the adherence to policies is apparent in the day-to-day operation of the agency e.g., line personnel are routinely held accountable for compliance, not by the monitoring staff, but by their sergeants, and sergeants are routinely held accountable for compliance by their lieutenants and command staff. In other words, the APD “owns” and enforces its policies.


In the November 12, 2021 IMR-14 report, the Federal Monitor reported the 3 compliance levels as follows:

Primary Compliance: 100 %; (No change)
Secondary Compliance: 82 %; (No change)
Operational Compliance: 62 % (An increase 3% points)

Regarding the compliance levels, the Federal Monitor wrote:

“These data depict an organization that is willing to ‘chip away’ at the margins, completing expeditiously tasks that improve efficiency – and even effectiveness – but steadfastly refusing to make meaningful reform to processes involving use of force, excessive use of force, the processes of police-community interactions on the street, supervision, command, and discipline.”

“These data indicate that over the last seven reporting periods (three years), APD has virtually held constant in its compliance outcomes. There has been remarkably little change in operational compliance levels since IMR-8 in 2013. Compliance figures have held steady over that period of time, with operational compliance registering 59 percent in IMR-8 and 62 percent in IMR-14.

When one considers the vast amounts of technical assistance, coaching, and problem-solving provided to APD by the monitoring team over the past seven reporting periods, a 3 percentage point increase in overall compliance is evidence that APD is unwilling or unable to meet the requirements of the CASA related to supervision and oversight of in-field operations. The data [collected] … indicate no meaningful improvement in operational compliance at APD since IMR-8. In the monitor’s experience, this represents a question.”



EDITOR’S NOTE: This information is prepared by the blog publisher. A review of APD’s compliance levels for the past two years for comparison is in order to get a better understanding of APD’s failure to implement the reforms and come into compliance. Operation Compliance for the last 3 years has hovered up and down from as low as 59% to the high of 66%.

It was in 2019 that APD was making the most progress in compliance with the reforms but for the next two full years thereafter there was a dramatic decline in compliance levels.

In the May 3, 2021 IMR-13 report, the Federal Monitor reported the 3 compliance levels as follows:

Primary Compliance: 100%;
Secondary Compliance: 82%, a 9% loss from previous report
Operational Compliance: 59%, a 3% loss from previous report


In the November 2, 2020 IMR-12 Report, the Federal Monitor reported the 3 compliance levels as follows:

Primary Compliance: 100% No change at 100%
Secondary Compliance: 91%, A 2% loss from previous report
Operational Compliance: 64% A 2% loss from previous report


In the MAY 4, 2020 IMR-11 Report, the Federal Monitor reported the 3 compliance levels as follows:

Primary Compliance: 100%;
Secondary Compliance: 93%;
Operational Compliance: 66%.


Comparing the November 1, 2019 IMR 10 Report to the IMR 11 Report the 3 compliance levels changed as follows:

Primary Compliance: No Change at 100%
Secondary Compliance: From 81% in IMR 10 to 93% in IMR 11, there was a 14.8% plus increase
Operational Compliance: From 64% in IMR 10 to 66% in IMR 11, a 3%. Increase

Page 4, IMR-11 Report


In the MAY 2, 2019 IMR-9 Report, the Federal Monitor reported the 3 compliance levels as follows:

Primary Compliance: 100%;
Secondary Compliance: 78%
Operational Compliance: 62%.

(Page 4, IMR-9 Report)


All documents related to APD’s settlement agreement can be downloaded and reviewed at this city web site link:



EDITOR’S NOTE: As is the case with virtually all of the 14 Federal Monitor Reports, the 330 page 14th report is verbose, very technical, difficult to read, difficult to follow and understand by the any average person of reasonable intelligence. Bolded category headlines and sentences are not part of the monitor’s report and have been added by the publisher to assist readers and to emphasize critical points and findings.

Major highlights that can be mined from the 14th Monitors Report are as follows:


“APD has completed the 2021 firearms training cycle, and in doing so, has moved back into operational compliance.

APD’s Training Academy has made meaningful progress in resurrecting its training processes.

APD Recruitment staff continue to develop strategies and concepts for recruiting new police officers during the pandemic. At a time when interest in the profession is down significantly nationwide, APD Recruiting has managed to increase interest in APD by utilizing digital platforms to reach an applicant pool that now includes at least 43 states.”


“The most important issues affecting APD during the IMR-14 reporting period involve misconduct investigations, use of force investigations, the lack of progressive discipline when misconduct is found, and supervision and leadership.

All non-force-related misconduct investigations completed by APD … were found to be deficient. A total of 17 misconduct cases, 6 investigated by Internal Affairs and 9 area command investigations were reviewed, including two that were completed by outside agencies.

The only properly investigated case reviewed by the monitoring team this reporting period was completed by an outside agency. In two consecutive reporting periods, a virtual shut down of use of force investigations has occurred in Internal Affairs.

Only seven, or 3%, of the 216 Level 2 cases opened were closed. Only 1 of those 7 was completed within 90 days, or less than one-half of a percent. Only two of 91 Level 3 use of force cases opened during this period were completed by [Internal Affairs Force Division] IFD or 2%. Neither of the 2 cases were completed within the CASA required 90-day period.

We find these failings to be more than notable, given the amount of time the monitoring team spent with APD in the last three reporting periods specifically focused on process improvement processes at [the Internal Affairs Force Division] IAFD. Of the twelve cases reviewed for compliance concerning discipline, only 58% met the requirements for adherence to progressive discipline as outlined in the CASA.

A second backlog of 667 uninvestigated use of force cases, as of the draft of this report, was reported. This second backlog is more than double the initial backlog APD dealt with from 2018-2020 and does not include any of the contemporary cases left uninvestigated by IAFD.

Approximately 83% of these cases are already time-barred for discipline in accordance with the CBA, should misconduct be found. Since its discovery, this backlog has been reduced from 667 cases to 660 cases (as of October 25, 2021). At this rate of case productivity, we project that it will take APD 94 months to “clear” this second backlog, which, again, would ensure no disciplinary actions for policy violations in another 667 cases.”


“Given the amount of focus on the problems related to [the Internal Affairs Force Division] IAFD investigations in previous monitor’s reports, and the exceptional amounts of technical assistance provided by the monitoring team relating to IAFD processes, we can only conclude that this new backlog was intentional, and yet another canard designed to ensure that officers are not disciplined for known policy violations. We consider this another example of deliberate non-compliance exhibited by APD.

Leadership and supervision, especially in the critical areas of reform listed above, are simply lacking—or in some cases not extant. As such, these findings require direct action by the City and APD leadership to identify the causes of, and to take corrective actions responding to, what can only be described as deliberate failures to comply with existing APD policy and with CASA requirements.

Given the extensive amounts of technical assistance provided by the monitoring team related to misconduct investigations and to workload management, we can only conclude that these jarring failures are deliberate.

This reform project’s evaluation process, i.e., the manner in which the monitoring team assesses and reports progress on the required reforms, has been closely aligned to the measurable tenets of effective management.

First, the methodology closely conforms with the concept that effective management is based on developing cogent and coherent policies (articulation of acceptable activities required of police personnel).

Officers, supervisors, managers, and leaders must be clearly “on notice” of organizational expectations, so that they understand and are willing to adhere to those expectations. Once these reformative policies have been articulated, all involved personnel (recruits, officers, supervisors, and managers) must be trained to the point that they understand and are capable of implementing these policies.”


“Finally, and most importantly, once adequate policies are developed and effective training is delivered, police personnel (recruits, officers, supervisors, managers, and leaders) must be willing and able to ensure that the policies and training are followed in the field.

Once that initial commitment is achieved, and personnel are adequately trained to the point that they are capable of implementing their training on a day-to-day basis and can implement expected operational processes, progress is possible. This means that departmental operations should change, such that the vast majority of police interactions will occur within parameters established by policy, training, and supervision.

In addition, it is assumed that those few officers, supervisors, and managers who prove they cannot or will not comply to organizational norming processes will be identified by internal oversight processes, and will be either retrained, counseled, or “disciplined” to the point that compliance either occurs or they decide to leave the agency (or in rare instances are separated from the agency).”


“The monitor’s oversight process for APD during the past six years has been based on this near-universal understanding of police operational management and control. After six years of implementation, APD has fallen significantly short in its ability to engender the supervisory, managerial, and leadership efforts that have been demonstrated much earlier in other law enforcement agencies monitored in this manner.

The fact that this planned change process works, and can work well, is documented in the fact that a large majority of this monitor’s staff working on the Albuquerque Police Department monitoring process are past members of organizations that have been directly monitored by the current APD monitor.

These team members have “lived the change process” and done so successfully in their respective agencies, thus are uniquely situated to guide APD successfully through the change process.

Given the amount of technical assistance provide to APD by members of this monitoring team; given the fact that for every “out-of-compliance” outcome found by the monitor, there are recommendations developed to guide APD into compliance; given the inordinate amounts of “technical assistance” provided to APD by 4 members of the monitoring team over the past six years.

The monitor can only conclude, based on his knowledge, training and experience, that these failures at APD are deliberate.”


The Federal Monitor offered the following summation:


“APD has made progress this reporting period. Effective management is evident in the policy development and dissemination function. The Performance Metric Unit continues to do stellar work in planning, developing, and implementing practices to assess performance in the field.

[The Special Operations Division] SOD and [Special Investigations Division] SID, the recruiting function, and Citizen Policing Councils all have shown consolidation and integration of effort this reporting period. In addition, APD has completed the 2021 Firearms training cycle, moving several paragraphs back into operational compliance as a result.

The policy development and approval process is much improved over the past few reporting periods, with APD demonstrating the ability to think critically about work processes and producing policy drafts that require only modest input from the monitor.

Given the results of our review of APD support and administrative functions, APD has made substantial progress in resurrecting its training practices (which we found to be in disarray in IMRs 12 and 13).

In addition, we found no major compliance issues with [Electronic Control Weapons] ECW usage by APD during this reporting period, though we note that a new training cycle related to ECW is imminent and recommend that the training documentation be provided to the monitor for review prior to implementation.”


“We have noted critical potential issues with APD’s Force Review Board this reporting period, including our assessment that the number of uses of force requiring review by [the Force Review Board] FRB are likely to overload the review and assessment mechanism. This speaks as much to APD’s inability (or unwillingness) to control unnecessary or improper uses of force as it does to the efficacy of the Force Review Board itself.

The sheer volume of reported uses of force by APD officers threatens to overload the oversight system. This is both a commentary on the magnitude of reportable uses of force effectuated by APD officers and the relative inability or unwillingness of APD field commanders to call out improper uses of force.

As with past reporting periods, however, the central CASA requirements related to use of force continue to need a great deal of scrutiny and oversight if APD is to reach full compliance with the requirements of the CASA.”


“APD’s training and in-field practices related to crowd control, oversight, and related processes also show the need for improvement. In general, policy development, training, supervision, and oversight of force-related practices require intense scrutiny from all APD command levels.

We have developed multiple recommendations for improvement processes related to use-of-force issues in the 14th report. We recommend APD review these recommendations carefully, and consider, create, and deliver a broad-scale, coordinated response designed to address those issues and recommendations.

As usual, we recommend APD develop a detailed Problems-Issues-Needs-Solutions assessment outlining their findings related to identifying, classifying, and managing use of force events involving APD personnel. The monitoring team stands ready to assist APD with this process.”


“For the last seven reporting periods, operational compliance levels have been virtually static, with operational compliance levels holding at or near an average of 62 percent. Actual data points range from a low of 59 percent (IMR-8 and IMR-13) to a high of 66 percent (IMR-11).

Our assessment is that APD has dealt with the low hanging fruit of the CASA and has deliberately failed to deal with the issues that are the crux of the reform process: officers’ tendencies to use unnecessary force, to under-report (or fail to report) uses of force, and supervisory and oversight personnel’s unwillingness to identify, classify, and correct these issues.

Obviously, use of force practices are a key element of the reform process. To date, APD, as an organization, has simply refused to deal effectively with pressing use of force issues. The monitoring team has provided, and continues to, provide more technical assistance to APD than any other police department it has monitored.

For the most part, that technical assistance is not implemented by APD when it comes to identifying, classifying, investigating, and correcting unnecessary uses of force by its personnel.

The monitor is convinced that, at this point, failures by APD to deal with improper uses of force are related to will, not ability.”


The City Attorney and APD officials do not dispute the data contained in the 14th Federal Monitor’s Report, but sharply took issue with the way it is presented in the report.


City Attorney Esteban Aguilar, Jr. had this to say:

“Using … inflammatory hyperbolic language is improper editorializing in a whole lot of areas. … It improperly ascribes intent to the work of our officers, the women and men who are on the ground, trying to not only keep us safe, but trying to implement all of the provisions of constitutional community-based policing.”

“We have failures, you know, we still have … 37% operational compliance to attain, so we do have a long way to go. … But we’re not at the beginning of this process. And, I think it does a disservice to the work of the department, but also the work of the community members who have been engaged in this process, and who have been actually asking for meaningful change as well, because we’ve been walking with them step by step throughout this process.”


APD Chief Medina condemned the 14th Federal Monitor report saying it’s easy for someone who is “thousands of miles away” to point at APD’s problems and saying it’s intentional. Medina claims that everyone is working to comply in the best way they can and he had this to say:

“It’s a matter that we don’t know how to do stuff to their liking, or to their standards. … I think that’s been a problem from the very beginning is that instantly when APD fails, they’re tagged by the monitoring team, DOJ, as ‘Oh, APD is resisting this.’ No, you guys are all here because APD sometimes doesn’t know how to do this stuff. And that’s what we should be doing is if we’re doing it wrong, correct us more quickly, and give us the lag time to put the fixes in place.”

Medina said he agreed with parts of the report and acknowledge there is more work to done particularly with some officers in the ranks who are not doing what is required under the consent decree. Medina had this to say:

“There may be individual officers that may be deliberately not doing something they need to do. … The thing I take offense to is that leadership questions that this isn’t being supported by leadership.”



Shaun Willoughby, president of the Albuquerque Police Officer’s Association, had this to say about the 14th Federal Monitor’s Report:

“Dr. Ginger is pointing the finger at APD, saying that they’re doing this intentionally. That’s an absolute absurd joke. It’s a lie. … The monitor was supposed to be here in Albuquerque, helping with technical assistance. He’s doing that over Zoom and over phone calls from a different state.”

What Willoughby does not disclose is that the monitor did live here for a while and it is not just him doing all the work. The federal monitor’s reports and the data being collected is being done by a team of upwards of 10 employees who come to the city, review data and work with APD to give them guidance.



APD Forward is a coalition of 27 police reform advocacy groups and community stakeholders that were instrumental in petitioning in bringing the Department of Justice to the city to investigate APD’s use of deadly force. The American Civil Liberties New Mexico chapter is part of APD Forward and acts as it main spokesperson. Barron Jones, a senior policy strategist with the ACLU, said after reading the report, it’s clear that APD still has a lot of work to do and said:

“Unfortunately, it’s more of the same [from APD]. … While we recognize the department’s efforts to improve training and that the performance metric unit is up and helping folks analyze trends we believe that the crux of the reform lies in the department’s ability to address bad behavior, or out of policy violations. That doesn’t seem to be happening yet during another monitor report.

“It just sort of boils down to are they completing those use of force investigations in a timely manner, in a way that [APD] … leadership can take corrective action and address behavior before it gets out of hand. You know, the department can make all the changes in the world, but if they can’t get that component right, then the reform process is falling flat. ”

Jones said that it is not clear what APD Forward will do in response to the 14th report filed.

Links to quoted source material are here:




The City Attorney, Chief Medina and police union President Ghostbuster’s “Slimer Shaun” Willoughby did not dispute the data contained in the 14th Federal Monitor’s Report, yet they slamed the monitor’s report calling his conclusions “inflammatory hyperbolic language”, “improper editorializing” an “absolute joke” and the Chief admitting that “sometimes APD doesn’t know how to do this stuff”.


APD Chief Harold Medina once again is an embarrassment as he exhibits his ignorance and shows he is way over his head when it comes to the DOJ reforms when he says:

“It’s a matter that we don’t know how to do stuff to their liking, or to their standards. … I think that’s been a problem from the very beginning is that instantly when APD fails, they’re tagged by the monitoring team, DOJ, as ‘Oh, APD is resisting this.’ No, you guys are all here because APD sometimes doesn’t know how to do this stuff.”

All that “stuff” and the DOJ standards Medina is talking about are constitutional policing practices that prevent APD from using excessive use of force and deadly force that created the “culture of aggression” found by the Department of Justice. It was a culture of aggression that Medina was aware of, contributed to and failed to take any action to stop.

Simply put, Medina was and still is a big part of the problem as reflected by his sure incompetence over the last 4 years working for Mayor Tim Keller first as APD Deputy Chief in charge of field services then as first Deputy Chief before he orchestrated Chief Geier’s termination and was appointed by Keller as permanent APD Chief.


Ghostbuster’s “Slimer Shaun” Willoughby, president of the Albuquerque Police Officer’s Association, is the one who is the “absolute absurd joke” and who is lying when it comes to saying the monitor gave no “technical assistance” and slighted the monitor’s reliance on “zoom” technology and not living in the city. The blunt truth is that the Federal Monitor has no management, nor control over APD. It is APD management, including the police union membership of Sergeants and Lieutenants, that are responsible to implement the reforms, not the monitor.

During the past 7 years, Shaun Willoughby and the police union members he represents have done everything they can to undercut the police reforms brought on by the Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation that found a “culture of aggression” and repeated use of deadly force and excessive use of force. The Federal Court Appointed Monitor some time ago labeled the union interference with the reforms as the “County Casa Effect”. The Federal monitor defined the Counter Casa Effect as a group of “high-ranking police officers who are Sergeants and lieutenants, who go to extreme lengths to excuse officer behaviors that clearly violate established and trained APD policy.”

The federal monitor has said that APD management “uses excuses, deflective verbiage, de minimis comments and unsupported assertions to avoid calling out subordinates’ failures to adhere to established policies and expected practice. The monitor has said “sergeants and mid-level managers lieutenants routinely ignore serious violations, fail to note minor infractions, and instead, consider a given case “complete”.

Federal monitor Ginger has said:

“the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) disciplinary timelines, appear at times to be manipulated by supervisory, management and command levels at the area commands, letting known violations lie dormant until timelines [mandated by the union contract] for discipline cannot be met. … Supervision, which includes Lieutenants and Sergeants in the union, need to leave behind its dark traits of myopia, passive resistance, and outright support for, and implementation of, counter-CASA processes.”


On April 27, 2021, it was widely reported that the Albuquerque Police Officers Association (APOA) launched a $70,000 political ad campaign to discredit the Department of Justice (DOJ) mandated reforms saying the police reforms are preventing police officers from doing their jobs and combating crime.

APOA Police Union President Shaun Willoughby described the need for the public relations campaign this way:

“You can either have compliance with DOJ reforms or you can have lower crime. You can’t have both. We think it’s time that our city leaders hear from the public that crime matters more because it does. … They want to focus on the growing crime problem, instead of wasting millions of dollars on endless Department of Justice oversight. … This conversation of reform needs to come back to common sense.”


After a full 4 years under Mayor Tim Keller, its likely APD will continue with the same ploy of not accepting responsibility for their continued failure to implement the reforms.

The biggest complaint of all the DOJ consent decrees in the country is implementation and enforcement “go on and on” for years, costing millions in taxpayer dollars. That is exactly what is happening in Albuquerque, and will continue to do so unless the Federal Court puts the brakes on it. The single most remarkable understatement made during a December 4 status conference hearing was made by Special Counsel for the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division Paul Killebrew when he said:

“APD has proven over and over again its agility to avoid the requirements of the CASA.”

It’s more likely than not APD management, the union and the rank and file will continue with their efforts of “noncompliance” and obstruction tactics. Where there is a will to obstruct the CASA reforms, APD management and the Police Union always find a way. The City and the DOJ have failed to learn that lesson after 7 years and millions spent on the reform effort. The Federal Monitoring Team after 7 years know without any doubt what needs to be done with use of force investigation and knows where things are lacking. The 300 plus page audits covering each time the 271 reforms and the Monitor always have the same old refrain “it’s not my job” to manage does not cut it.


Returning to a time of deadly use of force, excessive use of force and a “culture of aggression” by APD is not an option. Tim Keller has been a failure, despite his pronouncement that he “owned it”, with his efforts to implement the reforms. With the release of the 14th Federal Monitor’s report, the always publicity seeking news hound Keller was nowhere to be found to make comment on the report content now that he has another 4 years. Instead, Keller allows his City Attorney and APD Chief to do the dirty work for him to criticize the 14th report.

Now that Mayor Tim Keller has been elected to a second 4-year term, APD management, the police union, including Sergeants and Lieutenants who are allowed to be in the police union, will continue to be openly critical of the Federal Monitor. They will resist the police reforms with the ultimate goal of having the case dismissed.

Given Keller’s own leadership failure and reluctance to hold his appointed APD command staff accountable for their failures, the Department of Justice should quickly move and ask for a takeover of APD with a court appointed receiver to get done what they want done and what needs to be done to achieve constitutional policing practices.


Enough wasting time, enough wasting millions with very little to show for, enough hoping things will get better allowing APD to implement the reforms for compliance. It is not at all likely that after 7 years and millions spent and another 4 more years of Mayor Keller’s failed leadership APD is going to get any better when it comes to APD police reform.

The DOJ needs to be ordered to take over APD with an appointed receiver who will be aggressive and get the job done.



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Pete Dinelli was born and raised in Albuquerque, New Mexico. He is of Italian and Hispanic descent. He is a 1970 graduate of Del Norte High School, a 1974 graduate of Eastern New Mexico University with a Bachelor's Degree in Business Administration and a 1977 graduate of St. Mary's School of Law, San Antonio, Texas. Pete has a 40 year history of community involvement and service as an elected and appointed official and as a practicing attorney in Albuquerque. Pete and his wife Betty Case Dinelli have been married since 1984 and they have two adult sons, Mark, who is an attorney and George, who is an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT). Pete has been a licensed New Mexico attorney since 1978. Pete has over 27 years of municipal and state government service. Pete’s service to Albuquerque has been extensive. He has been an elected Albuquerque City Councilor, serving as Vice President. He has served as a Worker’s Compensation Judge with Statewide jurisdiction. Pete has been a prosecutor for 15 years and has served as a Bernalillo County Chief Deputy District Attorney, as an Assistant Attorney General and Assistant District Attorney and as a Deputy City Attorney. For eight years, Pete was employed with the City of Albuquerque both as a Deputy City Attorney and Chief Public Safety Officer overseeing the city departments of police, fire, 911 emergency call center and the emergency operations center. While with the City of Albuquerque Legal Department, Pete served as Director of the Safe City Strike Force and Interim Director of the 911 Emergency Operations Center. Pete’s community involvement includes being a past President of the Albuquerque Kiwanis Club, past President of the Our Lady of Fatima School Board, and Board of Directors of the Albuquerque Museum Foundation.